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NOTES

GAINING ACCESS TO PRIVATE PROPERTY:
THE ZONING PROCESS AND
DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS

CatherineLockard*
INTRODUCTION

In the last few decades, the Supreme Court has greatly limited
access to private property by nonemployee union organizers.' Unions
have been unable to use litigation to carve out exceptions allowing

increased access. At a conference in the summer of 2002, Andrew
Strom, an attorney for Service Employees International Union, cognizant of unlikely success by relying on the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB), determined that unions may be more successful by
exploring a different strategy. The strategy, according to Strom,
would be for unions to use the zoning process as a means to gain
*

Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2004; B.A., Seattle

University, 1998. I would like to thank Professor Barbara Fick for formative help and
insightful feedback. My personal thanks to my parents for encouraging me to attend
law school and to my husband for supporting me through school. A special thanks to

Professors Hamida Bosmajian, Erik Olsen, and Sr. Rosaleen Trainor for helping me
realize my potential. Finally, my thanks to the Notre Dame Law Review staff for their
hard work and needed support.
1 See generally R. Wayne Estes & Adam M. Porter, Babcock/Lechmere Revisited:
Derivative Nature of Union Organizers' Right of Access to Employers' Property Should Impact
JudicialEvaluation of Alternatives, 48 SMU L. REv. 349, 350-71 (1995) (describing the
current state of the law through a discussion of NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S.
105 (1956), and Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992)); Alan L. Zmija, Union
OrganizingAfter Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB-A Time to Reexamine the Rule of Babcock &
Wilcox, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 65, 72-99 (1994) (oudining the current state of the law
through a discussion of current statutes and recent judicial and administrative
rulings).
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greater access rights. 2 While proffering this new strategy, Strom did

not expound upon it to flesh out the pitfalls associated with such a
strategy. This Note looks at using the zoning process and development agreements as means to expand access.
Part I briefly discusses the Supreme Court cases that limit access
rights, but have not foreclosed the possibility for state and local action
to expand access rights. Part II.A discusses the novel idea of using the
zoning process to secure more access rights, with particular attention
to the regulatory takings issues that may arise in requiring private land
owners to allow free speech activities to take place on their land. Part
II.B considers the First Amendment problems that may arise from limiting speech occurring on private property. Finally, Part III looks at
development agreements as a means to gain exactions without raising
regulatory takings or First Amendment issues. Overall, this Note concludes that if unions are unable to secure limited access rights
through the zoning process, then development agreements are a viable alternative.
I.

THE COURT'S FORECLOSURE OF ACCESS RIGHTS

The federal government protects self-organization under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 3 while the Constitution preserves
4
private property rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Supreme Court historically balanced these two interests by formulating the basic principle that an employer could prohibit access by
nonemployee organizers so long as the organizers had reasonable alternative channels of communication. 5 In NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox,
2 Andrew Strom, Using State and Local Law to Increase Access to Private Property, Presentation at the 2002 AFL-CIO Lawyers' Coordinating Committee Conference (Apr. 29, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
3
4

29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.

5 NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956). The distinction
between employee and nonemployee is rudimentary labor law. The NLRA gives
rights to employees, not unions. In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 531-32
(1992), the Supreme Court stated:
Section 7 of the NLRA provides in relevant part that "[e]mployees shall have
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations." 29
U.S.C. § 157. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, in turn, makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [§ 7]." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1). By its
plain terms, thus, the NLRA confers rights only on employees, not on unions
or their nonemployee organizers. In NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., however,
we recognized that insofar as the employees' "right of self-organization depends in some measure on [their] ability. .. to learn the advantages of self-
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the Court specifically stated that an employer may "post his property
against nonemployee distribution of union literature if reasonable efforts by the union through other available channels of communication will enable it to reach the employees with its message and if the
employer's notice or order does not discriminate against the union by
allowing other distribution." 6 Babcock & Wilcox tipped the scales in
favor of employer private property rights, much to the exclusion of
union access rights.
The Supreme Court in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB further limited the
access rights of nonemployee organizers. 7 The Court essentially
banned nonemployee union organizers from entering private employer property "[s] o long as nonemployee union organizers have reasonable access to employees outside employer's property ....It is only

where such access is infeasible that it becomes necessary and proper
to . . .balanc[e] the employees' and employers' rights .. .

8

The

Court construed reasonable access through other channels of communication so broadly as to include radio, newspapers, and phone
calls 9-methods undoubtedly less effective than direct distribution
and solicitation. Because the Court found that many different forms
of communication are sufficient, the balancing of employers' and employees' interests is seldom necessary.
In the wake of Babcock & Wilcox and Lechmere, employers' property rights have been protected to the extreme detriment of the labor
movement. Unless a work site is geographically isolated, unions have
no general access rights. Unions, therefore, have difficulty gaining
information about the employees and even more difficulty obtaining
information regarding the benefits of unionization to the workers. As
a result, union organizers today are eager to find new means of gaining access rights.
organization from others," § 7 of the NLRA may, in certain limited circumstances, restrict an employer's right to exclude nonemployee union organizers from his property.
Id. (citations omitted).
6 Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112. Because the Court restricts employers from discriminating between union and other groups, there is much litigation over employers who
have lost property rights by allowing groups such as the Salvation Army on their property. For a discussion on this topic, see Laurie Nicole Robinson & Evan J. Spelfogel,
Retail Industry Picketing and Hand Billing: Access Rights of Non-Employee Union Representatives, Striking and Off-Duty Employees to Shopping Malls, ParkingFields, Stores, and Other
Private Property, 17 LAB. LAW. 153 (2001).
7 See Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 527.
8 Id. at 538.
9 See id. at 540.
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Access Rights Dependent on State Law

Although the holding in Lechmere established a federal constitutional right for employers to exclude union organizers from their
property, the effective access enjoyed by unions nonetheless relies on
state law. Access rights depend upon state, not federal, law because
state law determines exactly what constitutes "property." 10 In
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, the Supreme Court determined
that a state may "exercise its police power or its sovereign right to
adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than
those conferred by the Federal Constitution."'"
In PruneYard, a group of high school students sought signatures
at a shopping mall in opposition to a political issue. 12 A security
guard at the mall asked the students to leave. 13 The students sued. 14
The California Supreme Court "decided that Art. 1, §§ 2 and 3, of the
California Constitution gave [the students] the right to solicit signatures on [PruneYard's] property in exercising their state rights of free
expression and petition."1 5 The U.S. Supreme Court determined that
California's constitutional provisions did not violate the property
owner's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment property rights or his First
Amendment free speech rights.1 6 California's state constitution,
therefore, provides greater free speech protection than the federal
Constitution. The Supreme Court in PruneYard acknowledged that
even if internal sidewalks in a shopping center did not meet the definition of a public forum under the U.S. Constitution, greater free
speech protection afforded by the California Constitution could
render the area open to public expressive activity under state law.1 7
Of course, as PruneYard recognized, the federal Constitution prohibits states from substantially impairing the economic value of the
property. States may only "adopt reasonable restrictions on private
property so long as the restrictions do not amount to a taking without
just compensation." 18 It is important to note that allowing free speech
10

PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980).

11
12
13

Id. at 81.
Id. at 77.
Id.

14

Id.

15

Id. at 80.

16
17
18

Id. at 88.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 81. PruneYard and its progeny have come under fierce attack by com-

mentators concerned about "discount[ing] property rights while extending greater

personal expression rights to citizens in light of the nondiscrimination provision of
Section 8 of the NLRA and federal preemption issues." Harry G. Hutchison, Through
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activities did not amount to a taking because the California Constitution granted more free speech rights than the federal Constitution.
This fact makes the PruneYard case distinct from most other regulatory takings cases. The issue of takings, however, remains in states
that do not provide more expansive free speech rights than the federal Constitution. Part II addresses whether local governments granting greater access rights during the zoning process constitutes a
taking. Part III.C addresses whether development agreements are
subject to a takings analysis.
The Supreme Court in PruneYard found that the extent of an employer's property rights under the NLRA is defined by state law.' 9
The primacy of state law in this area was reaffirmed in Thunder Basin
Coal Co. v. Reich,20 where the Supreme Court stated that " [t] he right of
employers to exclude union organizers from their private property
emanate [s] from state common law, and while this right is not super''
seded by the NLRA, nothing in the NLRA expressly protects it. 21
Therefore, even after Lechmere, in states whose constitutions grant
greater speech protection than the federal Constitution 22 and where
an employer opens its premises to the public, an employer may not
prevent union organizers from leafleting on certain areas of the pri23
vately owned property.
B.

Access by Means of Disparate Treatment

In Lechmere, the Supreme Court noted that Lechmere had established an official store policy that prohibited nonemployees "from
the PruneYard Coherently: Resolving the Collision of PrivateProperty Rights and Nonenployee
Union Access Claims, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 7 (1994) (citation omitted). This discounting
of property rights is viewed as a taking under the Fifth Amendment. One commentator has argued that as a result of PruneYard, a new theory of property has evolved,
which "sees an inevitable opposition between private property and a free society." Id.
at 6. This "new property theory" takes a different view towards property than traditional classical liberalism. Id. at 6-7. A traditional view of property will lead one to
classify state balancing of free speech and union organization activities as more likely
being a taking. Id. Whereas, if property inherently encompasses a balance between
private property and free speech, as new property theorists believe, the state can make
private property a limited public forum without raising a takings issue. Id.
19 See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 84.
20 510 U.S. 200 (1994).
21 Id. at 217 n.21.
22 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2-3. The vast majority of states have concluded
that the protections afforded by their state constitutions are identical to those of the
federal Constitution. See Strom, supra note 2 (manuscript at 2).
23 See, e.g., NLRB v. Calkins, 187 F.3d 1080, 1091-93 (9th Cir. 1999); Indio Grocery Outlet, 323 N.L.R.B. 1138, 1142-43 (1997).
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soliciting and distributing literature at all times anywhere on Company property, including parking lots." 24 Lechmere consistently en-

forced this policy against nonunion organizations like the Salvation
Army and the Girl Scouts. 25 Relying on Lechmere, the NLRB and some

circuits have required "union-related access if an employer grants access to its property to various charitable organizations. '26 The notion
that an employer may not discriminate between union and nonunion
organizations for access purposes has not been universally accepted by
all circuits.

27

While alleging disparate treatment has been one avenue for securing access rights for unions, many employers have countered by
adopting totally exclusive store policies like the one in Lechmere. By
simply eliminating all distribution and free speech activity from taking
place on their property, businesses thereby avoid the disparate treatment issue altogether. 28 This practical decision by businesses has foreclosed yet another means to access.
II.

USING THE ZONING PROCESS AS A MEANS TO SECURE
ACCESS RIGHTS

Very few states other than California grant greater speech protection than the U.S. Constitution. 29 While state constitutions can be
amended to reflect enhanced speech protection, the success of such
24 Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 530 n.1 (1992).
25 Id.
26 Robinson & Spelfogel, supra note 6, at 164. In Victory Markets, Inc., 322
N.L.R.B. 17, 24 (1996), for example, the NLRB found that where "Concord repeatedly permitted the use of its property for a wide range of charitable activity, and even
some commercial activity, unrelated to the operation of the mall itself," their barring
of union handbilling was discriminatory and unlawful.
27 In particular, the Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have disagreed with the
"NLRB's premise that permitting charitable solicitation while excluding non-employee union activities requires a finding of discrimination." Robinson & Spelfogel,
supra note 6, at 164. A recent case decided by the Sixth Circuit illustrates courts'
rejection of the NLRB's discrimination argument. See Albertson's Inc. v. NLRB, 301
F.3d 441, 451-52 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that Albertson's did not discriminate
against two local unions by refusing to allow them to distribute literature or to otherwise solicit on the premises of the company's stores, while allowing certain charities to

do so).
28 For a discussion of this issue, see George Wiszynski, Union and Employee Access, Presentation at the 2002 AFL-CIO Lawyers' Coordinating Committee Confer-

ence (Apr. 29, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Wiszynski deals
specifically with Wal-Mart's pending class action suit, and Wal-Mart's attempts to prevent unions from gaining access.
29 Strom, supra note 2 (manuscript at 14).
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campaigns is unlikely. . 0 Defeat at the state level in amending constitutions and defeat in the courts has led union activists to look to local
governments for the means to expand access rights. Union activists
can obtain legislation more easily on a local level than at the state
level. 3 ' To date, it remains unclear whether a local government would
have the authority to pass a PruneYardordinance with speech rights to
private property that is open to the public. Local authority to enact
such an ordinance would depend on whether state law preempts local
law on this matter. 32 However, where a "state legislature has been silent, it would appear that this type of land-use regulation would likely
'3 3
fall within the powers of a local government.
One way to secure more access rights is to require those seeking
to build or expand to dedicate certain land rights in exchange for
favorable building rights. The goal is to transform purely private
property into a type of limited public forum. Using the zoning process as a means to secure more access rights forces local government
to skirt two constitutional issues: limiting property rights to such an
extent that there is a regulatory taking, and limiting speech too much
to prevent a taking-thus creating a First Amendment problem.
A.

Government Conditions on Development: The Problem of Taking

The Fifth Amendment declares: "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation. '34 Local governments often allow property owners to develop their property subject
to specific conditions. Unions can try to convince local governments
to condition permits on an owner's willingness to allow speech activities on the property. These speech activities concessions create a window of access for union solicitation and distribution. The question
that unions will face going forward is whether a local government's act
of conditioning permits on the owner/developer allowing limited free
speech activities, pertaining directly to the owner/occupier of the
land, constitutes a taking.3 5 With no cases addressing this issue, cou30 Id. (manuscript at 11). One practical problem with such a campaign is that it
does not distinguish between commercial and noncommercial speech and also does
not protect against obscenity. Opponents can mount a campaign emphasizing these
potential dangers.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. (manuscript at 15).
34 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
35 At the time of this Note, no federal or state cases addressed this question. Furthermore, for the sake of this Note, it is assumed that the state does not grant greater
free speech rights than the federal government. An additional question, beyond the
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pled with the Supreme Court's indefinite test for determining what
constitutes a taking, the outcome of such litigation is, at best,
uncertain.
Two recent Supreme Court decisions discussed the threshold at
which conditions imposed on a development constitute a taking.3 6 In
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the government wanted an
easement across the land in exchange for a permit giving the Nollan's
permission to build a new house.3 7 The Coastal Commission claimed
that the new larger house would obstruct the view of the beach,
thereby making an easement necessary. 38 The Supreme Court reasoned that the police power allows state governments to place conditions on developments if the conditions are "rationally related" to
preventing harms caused by the new construction.3 9 A taking nevertheless occurs if the condition imposed "utterly fails to further the end
advanced as the justification ....In short, unless the permit condition
serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the
building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but 'an outand-out plan of extortion."' 40 In Nollan, there was no causal nexus
between the easement granting access to the beach and the erection
of the new house. 4 1 So, even though the Coastal Commission could
have lawfully denied the permit for no reason, it could not condition
42
the development on a spurious government purpose.
Dolan v. City of Tigard purportedly clarified the Nollan "rationally
related" test by establishing a two-part test. In Dolan, the city of Tigard
conditioned a permit for expanding a plumbing store on the owner's
granting of an easement for both a bicycle path to relieve traffic congestion and for a public greenway along a nearby creek to minimize
flooding. 43 In evaluating whether the condition constituted a taking,
the Court, following Nollan, required an "'essential nexus'. . . between
the 'legitimate state interest' and the permit condition enacted by the
city." 44 The Dolan Court, however, added a second prong evaluating
scope of this Note, is whether the regulatory takings analysis would differ for states,
such as California, that allow for more speech rights.
36 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
37 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828.
38 Id. at 828-29.
39 Id. at 836.
40

Id. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H.

1981)).
41
42
43
44

See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 377 (clarifying the Nollan standard).
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838-39.
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 377.
Id. at 386 (citations omitted).
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the proportionality between the onus of the condition and its justification.4 5 The second prong requires "[n] o precise mathematical calculation

.

.

.

but the city must make some sort of individualized

determination that the required dedication is related both in nature
and extent to the impact of the proposed development."46 The language of Dolan merely requires the city to make an individualized determination that the dedication of the property for limited access
rights is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the pro47
posed development on the community at large.
In Dolan, the Court found that there was a nexus-or an obvious
relationship-between the conditions placed on the property owner
and the goals of regulation. 48 The government contended that Dolan's proposed development would cause more runoff, increasing the
chances of the creek flooding. Likewise, store expansion would bring
more customers to the area, increasing overall traffic, which the bike
path would ameliorate. 49 When the Court examined the proportionality prong, it found that the onus placed on Dolan in relation to the
recreational easement on the greenway as well as the bike path was
not proportionate to the government's justifications for regulating. 50
The Court concluded that Tigard's regulation constituted a taking.5 1
B. Building Pennits: Private Property to Quasi-PublicFora
Without a Taking?
The question remains: If unions can use the zoning process to
gain greater access to private property, then would such a condition
meet the Nollan and Dolan regulatory takings test? Strom argues the
theory "that if the property owner does not allow [certain] type [s] of
speech, then those individuals who would have disputes with the
owner or its lessees must take to the city streets, imposing a burden on
the community-at-large." 5 2 In the terms used by the Dolan Court, this
goes to the nexus between the condition and the goal of regulation.
The government has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the community at large is not burdened with potential private disputes. Courts
45 Id. at 388.
46 Id. at 391. The Court's reasoning was based heavily on the fact that Tigard had
not made individualized findings to support such dedications. See id. at 393.
47 Id. at 391.
48 Id. at 387.
49 Id. at 387-88.
50 Id. at 394-96.
51 Id.
52 Strom, supra note 2 (manuscript at 16). Limiting speech raises several First
Amendment issues. See infra Part II.B.1-2.
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would apply a rational basis test to ensure that the governmental interest is rationally related to the exaction. Here, unlike in Nollan and
Dolan, there is a relationship between the interest and the exaction.
The developer will have to grant access rights so that the community is
not burdened with the disputes related particularly to that land. Accordingly, union attempts to compel municipalities to force private
landowners to create a limited public forum would automatically satisfy the first prong of the Dolan test.
As to the balance between the burden of the condition and its
justification, the test calls only for "rough proportionality. '5 3 In the
wake of Nollan and Dolan, there is no clear standard as to what evidence must be presented to show that there is rough proportionality
between allowing access rights and potential disputes with the development. By granting access rights-limited or otherwise-the property owner is giving up an essential stick in the bundle of property
rights, namely the right to exclude. Courts would most likely view the
impact on the landowner as quite severe, and much greater than the
burden placed on the community at large, if speech were not allowed
to take place on the private property.
Strom states that "[o] ne way a city might strive for proportionality
while seeking to secure access for free speech activity would be to require that property owners must accommodate only those individuals
who wish to speak about the property owner or their lessees. '54 He
claims that such a limitation would impose a lesser burden on the
property owner because he or she would not have to accommodate
every political petitioner. 55 While Strom correctly states that by limiting speech the proportionality requirement of Dolanwould have a better chance of being met, such an approach overlooks several First
Amendment issues.
1. Free Speech Prohibited on Private Property Even if Speech is
Related to the Property
The Supreme Court has found balancing free speech rights
against private property interests a difficult task. The concept of requiring property owners to allow access to their premises for those
desiring to exercise their First Amendment rights culminated in
Marsh v. Alabama.5 6 In Marsh, a corporation wholly owned Chickasaw,
53
54
55

Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
Strom, supra note 2 (manuscript at 16).
Id.

56

326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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a suburb of Mobile, Alabama. 5 7 Although the suburb was owned by a
corporation, the property was open to the public and contained residential buildings, streets, and a business block. 58 The First Amendment claim arose when a Jehovah's Witness was arrested while
distributing religious literature on a sidewalk in Chickasaw. 59 Upon
reaching the Supreme Court, the Court held that the "company town"
60
could not curtail First Amendment liberties for several reasons.
First, "ownership does not always mean absolute dominion" 6 1 because
"[t]he more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for
use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use
it."62 Second, when balancing the competing constitutional rights,
the Court stated that First Amendment rights occupy a preferred status, because the right to exercise liberties safeguarded by the First
Amendment "lies at the foundation of free government by free
men." 63 Accordingly, the majority determined that the private property had been sufficiently opened to the public to mandate that First
Amendment expressive activity be allowed. 64 Marsh has never been
expressly overruled.
Subsequently, in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v.
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,65 the Court considered whether "peaceful
picketing of a business enterprise located within a shopping center
can be enjoined on the ground that it constitutes an unconsented invasion of the property rights of the owners of the land on which the
center is situated."6 6 The Logan Valley Court argued that "unlike a
situation involving a person's home, no meaningful claim to protection of a right of privacy can be advanced by respondents here. Nor
on the facts of the case can any significant claim to protection of the
normal business operation of the property be raised." 67 In addition,
57

Id. at 502.

58 Id. The type of "hybrid property" presented by "company towns" has faded
away. See Mark C. Alexander, Attention, Shoppers: The'First Amendment in the Modern
Shopping Mall, 41 ARiz. L. REV. 1, 19 (1999) ("Company towns faded away, but the
ideas in Marsh did not.").
59 Marsh, 326 U.S. at 503.
60 Id. at 506-08.
61 Id. at 506.
62 Id. at 506.
63 Id. at 509 (quoting Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)).
64 Id. at 506-09.
65 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
66 Id. at 309. The Court also dealt with handbilling, but did not treat it separately
from picketing. Id. at 322 n.ll.
67 Id. at 324.
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the Court relied on statistics that showed the migration of shopping
from urban areas to suburbs. "Business enterprises located in. downtown areas would be subject to on-the-spot public criticism for their
practices, but businesses situated in the suburbs could largely immunize themselves from similar criticism by creating a cordon sanitaireof
parking lots around their stores. ' 68 Finding that "[n] either precedent
nor policy compels a result so at variance with the goal of free expres69
sion and communication that is the heart of the First Amendment,"
the Court held that ownership alone was insufficient to support an
70
injunction against the picketers and handbillers.
Four years after Logan Valley, in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,7 1 the Court
found that anti-Vietnam War protestors could be excluded from distributing literature at a shopping center. 72 The Lloyd Court reasoned
that, whereas the picketers in Logan Valley were concerned with the
land, "[t]he handbilling by respondents in the malls of Lloyd Center
had no relation to any purpose for which the center was built and
being used. '7 3 Furthermore, and in contrast to Marsh and Logan Valley, the Lloyd Court stated that property does not "lose its private character merely because the public is generally invited to use it for
designated purposes. Few would argue that a free-standing store, with
abutting parking space for customers, assumes significant public attributes merely because the public is invited to shop there." 74 The

Court held that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the
property owners outweighed the First Amendment rights of all
75
citizens.
In Hudgens v. NLRB, 7 6 the Court addressed the discrepancy between Logan Valley and Lloyd and found that "the rationale of Logan
Valley did not survive the Court's decision in the Lloyd case. ' 77
Hudgens's facts were similar to those in Logan Valley-persons peacefully picketing a retail store in a shopping center. 78 The Court stated
that if the Lloyd-picketers "did not have a First Amendment right to
enter that shopping center to distribute handbills concerning Viet68
69
70
71

Id. at 324-25.
Id. at 325.
Id.
407 U.S. 551 (1972).

72
73
74

Id. at 570.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 569.

75
76

Id.
424 U.S. 507 (1976).

77
78

Id. at 518.
Id. at 509.
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nam, then the pickets in [Hudgens] did not have a First Amendment
right to enter this shopping center for the purpose of advertising their
strike against the Butler Shoe Co."'7 9 Furthermore, the Court concluded that "under the present state of the law the constitutional guarantee of free expression has no part to play in a case such as

[Hudgens].'80
Hudgens made it clear that union organizers, as well as other citizens, enjoy no First Amendment right to enter private property to engage in free speech, even if that speech concerns the use of the land.
In this regard, the property rights of the owner trump any speech protections of the private citizen.8 1 The holding of Hudgens produced
the result foretold by the Logan Valley majority: businesses located in
shopping centers "immunize themselves . . . by creating a cordon
saintaire of parking lots around their stores."8 2 With such a cordon
saintaire,unions are unable to gain access to workers.
2.

Other First Amendment Issues

In addition to limitations on access imposed by Hudgens,attempts
by unions to gain access through local zoning ordinances could run
afoul of the First Amendment's prohibition of governmental contentbased speech restrictions. The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected attempts to limit the nature of public expression allowed in
public forums to "acceptable" topics such as labor picketing.8 3 The
government must have a compelling government interest in order to
justify content-based limitations on speech. Arguably, the compelling
interest could be limiting speech in order to meet the rough proportionality requirement, so that the exaction does not rise to the level of
a taking. While such an argument is probably not sanctionable under
Rule 11,84 the argument is tenuous at best.
Property owners, desirous of excluding union organizers, could
claim that the government conditioning zoning permits on allowing
79 Id. at 520-21.
80 Id. at 521.
81 This is, of course, absent any disparate treatment based on the speech. See
supra note 28 and accompanying text. Additionally, if the state grants greater speech
rights than the federal Constitution, unions may be able to gain access. See supranote
11-18 and accompanying text.
82 Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308, 325 (1968).
83 See, eg., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980); Police Dep't of Chicago v.
Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 94 (1972); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 107 (1972).
84 FED. R. Cry. P. 11.
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speech impermissibly compels expression. s 5 The Court has held that
forcing owners to provide access for speech violates the First Amendment. 86 It seems unlikely that the Court, having determined that
states cannot either compel access through statute or regulation,
would allow local governments to condition permits based on access
rights.
The likelihood of municipalities being able to satisfy the Nollan
and Dolan regulatory takings test if they condition permits on allowing
limited union access seems low. If limits were placed on the speech in
order to pass the proportionality prong, then First Amendment issues
probably would prevent such conditions. Most courts, likely, would
side with the property owners and continue to exclude unions.
III.

DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS

When local governments use exactions and dedications in the review and approval of land use development projects, the local governments must meet the Nollan and Dolan test. One way for local
governments to circumvent the regulatory takings issue preserved by
such "conditional permitting" is by entering into development agreements with developers/landowners. California enacted the first development agreement legislation in 1979.87 Since then twelve states have
enacted statutes expressly authorizing local governments to enter into
development agreements.88
Development agreements have been defined as agreements between a "developer and a local government [which] limit the power of
that government to apply newly enacted ordinances to ongoing developments. Unless otherwise provided in the agreement, the rules, reg85 See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES & POLICIES
941-42 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing cases related to the question of whether the government impermissibly compels expression when it forces people to use their property
for speech by others).
86 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1986);
Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). But see Red Lion
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969) (holding that the "fairness" doctrine,
requiring that public issues be presented by broadcasts and that each side be given
fair coverage, does not violate the First Amendment).
87 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65,865 (West 1997).
88 See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-500.05 (West 1996 & Supp. 2002) (amended
1997); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-68-101 (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3220
(West 2000); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-123 (Michie 2001); IDAHO CODE § 67-6511A
(Michie 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4780.22 (West 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
278.0201 (Michie 2002); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-45 (West 1991); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 94.504 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-31-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2002); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 15.2-2303.1 (Michie 2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70B.170 (West 2003).
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ulations, and official policies governing permitted uses, density,
design, improvement, and construction are those in effect when the
agreement is executed."89 The purpose of development agreements is
"to allow a developer who needs additional discretionary approvals to
complete a long-term development project as approved, regardless of
any intervening changes in local regulations."' 90 Simply put, a development agreement is a contract between a property owner or developer and a municipality. The purpose of a development agreement is
to prevent the municipality from making changes in land use law that
could impact the developer's project prior to its completion. Development agreements are customarily seen in large, long-term development projects.
Development agreements, like all contracts, must have consideration on both sides. Developers agree to certain conditions, fees, or
exactions in consideration for the agreement. To identify the municipality's consideration, one must recognize that the developer has "no
federal Constitutional right to be free from changes in land use
laws."9 1 The consideration offered by the local government is its
promise to make no changes to land use laws while the project is
pending. Because the development is a voluntary exchange for consideration, some argue the municipality should be permitted to exact
as much from the developer as the developer is voluntarily willing to
concede in exchange for the vested rights in unchanged land use
laws.9 2 Of course, this is not without debate and will be discussed in
more detail in relation to Venetian Casino Resort v. Local Joint
93

Commission.
Development agreements also have had to survive duress claims.
To successfully make a duress claim, the developer would have to
prove two elements: (1) a wrongful act or threat by the municipality,
and (2) a state of mind in which the developer was overwhelmed by
89 City of W. Hollywood v. Beverly Towers, Inc., 805 P.2d 329, 334 n.6 (Cal. 1991);
see also Michael H. Crew, Development Agreements after Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), 22 URa. LAw. 23, 27 (1990) (describing the benefits and
burdens of a development agreement for both municipalities and developers).
90 Beverly Towers, 805 P.2d at 334-35.
91 Lakeview Dev. v. South Lake Tahoe, 915 F.2d 1290, 1295 (9th Cir. 1990). If the
party already had the right to be free from changes, then the municipality would be
offering illusory consideration and the development agreement would be voidable.
Id.
92 Brad K. Schwartz, Note, Development Agreements: Contractingfor Vested Rights, 28
B.C. ENVTL. AlT. L. REv. 719, 742 (2001).
93 257 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2001).
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fear that precluded from using free will orjudgment. 94 In Meredith v.
Talbot County, a land developer tried to invalidate a development
agreement because he claimed it was the product of duress. 9 5 The
court held that "[t]he fact that the decision was made in the face of
likely adverse governmental action is of no consequence" because the
developer made a "reasonable and informed business decision" which
conferred benefits on all parties. 9 6 Basic contract law establishes that
one cannot void a contract merely because the contract was made
under strained circumstances. Developers, forced to act quickly because of impending land use law change, will not be able to subsequently rely on duress claims to declare the development agreement
voidable.
If municipalities require the developer to grant access rights for
limited free speech activities and the developer agrees to those terms,
courts likely will enforce such agreements. Contract law, not property
principles, would control the situation; the developers' regulatory takings claims and potential duress claims would be dismissed in most
circumstances.
A.

Mirage Casino-Hotel: A PerpetualEasement

In S.O.C., Inc. v. Mirage Casino-Hotel, the Nevada Supreme Court
considered whether an easement granted to the county by Mirage
contemplated commercial free speech access by other businesses. 97
In Las Vegas, because of tremendous growth, publicly owned sidewalks have had to be removed to accommodate the widening of Las
Vegas Boulevard.98 Mirage built a private sidewalk on its property to
accommodate pedestrian foot traffic. 99 As part of the zoning, licensing, and development plans for the Mirage resort, Mirage conveyed to
the county a "'perpetual pedestrian easement over, under, and across
the parcel of land' upon which the [private] sidewalk at issue is abut94

Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Joy, 389 A.2d 874, 881 (Md. 1978); see also RESTATEOF CONTRACTS § 175 (1979).
560 A.2d 599, 602 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (quoting Plechner v. Widener
Inc., 418 F. Supp. 1282, 1294 (E.D. Pa. 1976)).
Id. at 604. While this case was decided before Nollan and Dolan, it does not
that the case is any less persuasive as to development agreements. Duress is a

MENT (SECOND)

95
Coll.,
96
mean

term of art within the realm of contract law, and as development agreements are

contractual, this case is still pertinent.
97 23 P.3d 243 (Nev. 2001).
98 Id. at 245.
99 Id.
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ted. The legal description of the easement states that it is a 'pedes00
trian easement for the west right-of-way of Las Vegas Boulevard."
Erotic dance businesses, such as S.O.C., hired canvassers to solicit
business on the sidewalks in front of the Mirage. 10 ' The Mirage filed
02
for a preliminary and permanent injunction against the canvassers.
S.O.C. argued that the Mirage sidewalks were encumbered by a perpetual easement allowing for public access and that the canvassers'
handbilling fell within the scope of the perpetual easement.1 0 3 The
Ninth Circuit, in affirming the district court, summarily concluded
that "the mere existence of the easement does not implicate the protections of the First Amendment .... [T] he easement alone was insuf-

ficient to convert private property to a public forum ..... 104 The
Ninth Circuit stressed the general principle that ambiguous ease10 5
ments are to be construed in favor of the owner of the property.
The easement, therefore, was limited by the court to include pedestrian travel only.
The court also rejected S.O.C.'s First Amendment claim. While
conceding that the Mirage was a private entity, S.O.C. posited that the
Mirage "functionally assumed the role of the government by excluding [the] handbillers from a traditionally public venue."'1 6 The Ninth
Circuit also rejected this argument, finding that the "public function"
doctrine is not so expansive as to include owning and maintaining a
sidewalk as sufficient to become a state action. 10 7 Mirage, as a private
entity, was free to exclude canvassers without infringing upon their
First Amendment rights.
Lastly, S.O.C. argued that sidewalks, regardless of who owns and
maintains them, are a public forum. 0 8 In response, the Ninth Circuit
100

101
102
103
found

Id.

Id. at 246.
Id.
Id. In a previous case, a Clark County ordinance forbidding handbilling was
unconstitutional because it was content-based and there were less restrictive

means to limit littering. S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark, 152 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir.

1998).
104
105

Mirage Casino-Hotel, 23 P.3d at 246.
Id. at 247 (citations omitted).

106
107

Id.
Id. at 247-49. But see Marsh

v. Alabama,

326 U.S.

501 (1946) (finding that,

where a company owned an entire town and performed all of the municipal functions, the company was the equivalent of government for purposes of the First
Amendment).

108 Mirage Casino-Hotel, 23 P.3d at 248. For a Supreme Court case holding that a
sidewalk used only for ingress and egress is not a public forum, see United States v.
Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990). The sidewalk in Mirage Casino-Hotel, however, abutted
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stated: "Privately-owned property does not lose its private nature because the public traverses upon it."109 In buttressing this finding, the
court looked to the bundle of property rights, namely the right to
exclude. Merely because property is open to the public does not extinguish the rights surrounding private property ownership, 110 and
the court cited over a dozen cases with similar holdings.11 1 The Mirage sidewalk, despite the perpetual easement, was not converted into
a public or quasi-public forum.
In sum, Mirage Casino-Hotel typifies ajudicial analysis of cases without a development agreement. The court focused on the explicit language of the easement, upheld the property rights of the private
owner, and refused to turn a sidewalk into a public forum. Because
the court narrowly construed the easement in favor of the property
owner, a takings analysis was not necessary. But how would the court's
analysis change if, instead of an easement, it were interpreting a development agreement? The next section considers such a situation.
B. Venetian Casino: A Lane for a Sidewalk
In determining whether a particular space is a public forum, title
to the underlying property may not be dispositive." 2 The Ninth Circuit recently affirmed this principle in Venetian Casino Resort v. Joint
Executive Board, Las Vegas."1 3 The court evaluated whether a sidewalk
built on private property was a public forum subject to First Amendment protections. In Venetian Casino, developers wanted to demolish
the Sands Casino and build the Venetian. 1 4 A study showed that the
impact of the new casino on traffic would necessitate a new traffic
lane. 1 5- This meant that the existing public sidewalk would have to be
removed. 16 The development agreement entered into with the
county required the Venetian to "construct and maintain on its propthe "transportation grid" and was therefore used for more than ingress and egress.
Sidewalks which are part of the "transportation grid" are typically viewed as public
fora. See Chicago Acorn v. Metro. Pier & Exp. Auth., 150 F.3d 695, 702 (7th Cir.
1998).
109 Mirage Casino-Hotel, 23 P.3d at 248.
110 Id. at 249.
111 Id. at 249 n.40.
112 Allen Lichtenstein & Gary Peck, Sidewalk Democracy: Free Speech, PublicSpace and
the Constitution, NEV. LAW., May 2000, at 18.
113 257 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2001). This idea was first articulated by the Supreme
Court in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) ("Wherever the title of streets and
parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public.").
114 Venetian Casino, 257 F.3d at 939.
115 Id. at 940.
116 Id. at 939.
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erty ... a private sidewalk connecting to public sidewalks on either
l7
side of its property.""
Soon after the Venetian constructed a temporary pedestrian walkway on its private property, several unions applied for, and the county
issued, a permit for a demonstration in front of the Venetian on the
temporary sidewalk. 11 8 The Venetian, in response, erected signs "stating that the pedestrian walkway was private property."'119 Over one
thousand people demonstrated on the property in front of the Venetian, despite the casino's warnings that they were on private property.1 20 The local police department, upon the advice of the district
attorney, declined to remove the demonstrators, to issue citations, or
12 1
to arrest them.
The Venetian then filed a complaint, alleging "that by granting a
permit to the Unions to conduct a demonstration on the Venetian's
private sidewalk, and by refusing to assist the Venetian in removing
the demonstrators, the County has taken the Venetian's property without due process in order to create a public forum." 122 The unions
argued that "the Venetian dedicated the sidewalk to public use in exchange for approval from the County and State to construct the hotel
12 3
and casino complex."
The Ninth Circuit found that there was a "recorded servitude on
[the] parcel of private property upon which the replacement sidewalk
is located ... dedicate [d] to public use to provide unobstructed pedestrian access on that sidewalk." 124 The court determined that the
sidewalk, despite being located on private property, was a public forum.1 25 Instead of dealing with the takings issue, the majority focused
on the development agreement between the casino developers and
the local government. The Venetian Casino agreement between the
parties read in part:
1. That the DEPARTMENT is not taking any private property interest with this document. The use being permitted is at the request
of and for the benefit of the COMPANY and that the DEPARTMENT assumes no liability or risk resulting from said use in the
manner proposed.
117
118

Id.
Id.

119
120

Id.
Id.

121

Id.

122
123
124
125

Id. at 941.
Id.
Id. at 943.
Id. at 946.
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2. That DEPARTMENT retains the right of approval for the landscaped buffer area and new pedestrian walkway construction as
contemplated herein.
3. This agreement shall constitute the entire contract between the
parties hereto, and no modification hereof shall be binding unless endorsed in writing.

4. All covenants and agreements herein contained shall extend to
and be obligatory upon the heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, as the case may be, of the respective parties.
5. That this agreement shall be recorded.
6. The COMPANY retains full rights inherent to the ownership of
private property to the full extent permitted by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
the parties do not intend by this agreement that the DEPARTMENT is taking any state action as to the private sidewalk other
than the requirement in paragraphs 1 through 4 under "COM26
PANY AGREES" above. 1
The agreement expressly stated that the agreement was not a taking.
The agreement also spoke to the fact that both parties received consideration for the contract.
Criticizing the majority, the dissent argued that the County was
not merely "reserving, a right that it previously had. It came to the
contractual table with no rights in that piece of property, and the Venetian would have had to give over to the State 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights' that are commonly characterized as
property."' I2 7 The dissent found the terms of the contract insufficient
in that "in the contract with the State, the Venetian gave no dedication or easement for use by the general public as a sidewalk. If we do
not demand an even higher showing of express intent in this instance,
we should at least require the parties to be [more] explicit .... ,1128
The strong dissent notwithstanding, the Ninth Circuit majority
found the language of the agreement sufficient to transform the private sidewalk into a public forum. Because of the development agreement, unions, as well as other citizens, can now use the sidewalk
outside the Venetian Casino as they would any other public sidewalk.

126 Id. at 956 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 956 (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 393 (1994)).
128 Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
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C. Development Agreements and the Problem of Takings
The dissent and the majority in Venetian Casino highlight a current debate in the law, namely "how far the municipality may go in
129
If
imposing . . . conditions without violating the Taking Clause."
exactions imposed in a development agreement must meet the "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" tests of Nollan and Dolan, then
the extortion concerns Justice Scalia warned of in Nollan would have
to be addressed.13 0 If development agreements must satisfy the takings test, a municipality's ability to use its "regulatory leverage" to gain
3
advantageous terms would be curtailed.1 1
Some argue that while the Nollan and Dolan test was formulated
to address development exactions, the same test should be applied to
development agreements. 132 Under this view, the type and extent of
exactions permissible under a development agreement would be the
same as those permissible under a Nollan and Dolan analysis for conditions on development. In assessing the exactions in a development
agreement, courts should consider "the cost of existing public facilities and their manner of financing, the extent to which existing development has already contributed to the cost of these facilities, and the
extent to which the proposed project will contribute to the cost of the
existing facilities in the future." 133 The supporting rationale is to pre34
vent governmental abuse of power.1
What these critics fail to recognize is that development agreements differ from conditions on development in that the municipality
is not "granting the landowner the right to develop nor imposing conditions on such development."'13 5 Instead, the municipality "is promising to protect the developer's investment by not enforcing any
subsequent land use regulation that may burden the project.' 1 6 The
129 Schwartz, supra note 92, at 739; see also E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Forest Pres. Dist.,
613 F.2d 675, 679-80 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that a forest preserve ordinance
prohibiting E & E Hauling from depositing liquids and sludge in its landfill was urconstitutional because the forest used its legislative authority to prevent E & E from
fulfilling its contract).
130 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987). For a discussion of
the current debate surrounding development agreements and the Takings Clause, see
Schwartz, supra note 92, at 741.
131 See Schwartz, supra note 92, at 741.
132 See Crew, supra note 89, at 41-47, 49-59.
133 Id. at 27.
134 Id. at 46.
135 David L. Callies &Julie A. Tappendorf, UnconstitutionalLandDevelopment Conditions and the Development Agreement Solution: Bargainingfor Public Facilities After Nollan

and Dolan, 51
136 Id.

CASE

W. REs. L. REv. 663, 695 (2001).
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developer does not need any such guarantee and is free to proceed
without such an agreement. The developers, therefore, bargain out of
their own choice, and municipalities should be able to exact as much
as they can for such a guarantee. The Ninth Circuit, viewing the development agreement as a contract, stated that "a contractual promise
which operates to restrict a property owner's use of land cannot result
in a 'taking' because the promise is entered into voluntarily, in good
faith and is supported by consideration."1 37 Development agreements, at least in the Ninth Circuit, are subject to contract analysis,
not Nollan and Dolan regulatory takings analysis.
Currently, a majority of jurisdictions do not subject development
agreement cases to regulatory takings analysis. Municipalities have
undoubtedly been able to bargain for more exactions as part of the
development agreement than they have been able to exact in the zoning process.13 8 Until the Supreme Court decides a development
agreement case, municipalities will likely continue to use development agreements to exact more than would be available with development conditions. One such term municipalities could require is to
allow union access to employees. Of course, it will be up to unions to
decide how best to persuade officials to demand such a term as part of
the development agreement.
CONCLUSION

The zoning process is an interesting and potentially fruitful
means of gaining more access rights for nonemployee union organizers. Because Nollan and Dolan have a penumbra of uncertainty,
it is unclear if conditioning permits on granting access to certain
speech pertaining to land would be viewed as regulatory takings. Furthermore, it is unclear whether First Amendment issues would arise by
limiting the speech in order to meet the proportionality requirement
of Dolan.
In the thirteen states that currently allow development agreements, 139 and especially in the wake of Venetian Casino, access rights, if
secured in a contract, would not have to survive a regulatory takings
analysis. If unions were to lobby for development agreement legisla137 Leroy Land Dev. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 939 F.2d 696, 698 (9th Cir.
1991). In Leroy, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's finding that a settlement agreement entered into between the state and a developer could not constitute
an unconstitutional taking. Id.
138 JohnJ. Delaney, Development Agreements: The Road from Prohibitionto "Let's Make a
Deal!", 25 URB. LAW. 49, 55 (1993).

139

See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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tion in the thirty-seven states without such legislation, and were able to
have access terms written into development agreements, then access
rights could be secured through the agreement, thereby avoiding the
First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment issues. While development
agreements are typically for large projects, and therefore not applicable to most situations, they are still a promising means for acquiring
more access rights-a means that has not been foreclosed by the Supreme Court.
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